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1 Introduction
One of the most important problems in economic theory is the bargaining problem. The
bargaining problem studies how agents make an agreement when they can achieve a par-
ticular set of feasible payoffs by collaborating. A bargaining game consists of a sequence
of proposals and responses to the proposals. If a proposal is accepted by all the players,
the game ends. If a proposal is rejected by at least one player, the game continues and the
next proposal is made.
In this paper we prove a folk theorem for bargaining games. Folk theorems constitute
a class of theorems which state that any individually rational outcome can be sustained as
an equilibrium. Early contributions to the folk theorem literature are by Friedman (1971)
and by Rubinstein (1979). Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) have proved a folk theorem in
repeated games with discounting, where subgame perfect equilibrium is used as the solu-
tion concept. Since bargaining games do not belong to the class of repeated games, they
are not covered by these results.
Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011) prove a folk theorem for stochastic games generaliz-
ing an earlier result by Dutta (1995). A crucial assumption in both contributions is that of
irreducibility: starting from any given state, any other state is visited with a positive prob-
ability, irrespectively of the moves of any particular player. In bargaining games, some of
the states are terminal, and the irreducibility condition is clearly violated. Moreover both
Dutta (1995) and Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011) assume the set of states and the set of
actions to be finite, whereas a large part of the bargaining literature studies infinite action
sets. The existing folk theorems for repeated games and for stochastic games therefore do
not cover the bargaining model.
One of the main results in the field of bargaining has been proved in Rubinstein (1982).
Rubinstein (1982) studies two-person alternating offers bargaining and shows that there
is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in this model. In the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium, the proposal of the first proposer is immediately accepted by his opponent.
The folk theorem does evidently not hold for two-player bargaining games. We therefore
study bargaining games with at least three players in this paper.
The proof of Rubinstein (1982) does not work for bargaining problems with more than
two players. As reported in Binmore, Osborne, and Rubinstein (1992), one of the first
extensions to the three–person case was made by Shaked. In Shaked’s example, Player 1
starts by making a proposal which describes each player’s share of a unit surplus. The
other players must accept or reject this proposal sequentially. If the proposal is accepted
by all players, it is implemented and the game ends. If the proposal is rejected by one of
the players, next period begins and Player 2 makes a new proposal. Negotiation continues
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in this way. It is shown that any efficient payoff vector can be supported by subgame
perfect equilibrium strategies if the common discount factor is sufficiently high.
Herrero (1985) obtains a result similar to Shaked for the case with three or more play-
ers, though we will explain that the construction used in Herrero (1985) is not complete.
Haller (1986) also considers the case with three or more players in a game where players
vote simultaneously on a proposal. Haller (1986) shows that any efficient division of a unit
surplus can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium if the common discount factor
is sufficiently high.
All constructions used in the literature so far rely on strategies which require infinite
recall for all players. The action of a player in a given time–period depends on the whole
history of play. In particular, the strategy of every player at any given time–period depends
on the actual play in period zero. Infinite recall allows for the punishment of a player, who
has deviated from his strategy only once, during the whole remainder of the game. Several
authors have questioned the plausibility of such behavior.
Aumann (1981) discusses some of the options to narrow down the definition of equilib-
rium to avoid unreasonable predictions and mentions bounded recall as a way of modeling
bounded rationality in repeated games. Sabourian (1998) characterizes the set of bounded
recall pure subgame perfect equilibria in a setting without discounting. His results indicate
that the equilibrium set expends fast in the length of recall. Cole and Kocherlakota (2005)
show in a context with imperfect public monitoring that for some parameter settings the
assumption of bounded recall may reduce the set of equilibrium payoffs to a singleton. To
obtain such a result, however, they also make strong symmetry assumptions with respect
to the strategies under consideration. Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2009) study subgame
perfect equilibria that are purifiable and have bounded recall. Equilibrium strategies are
purifiable if they also constitute an equilibrium of a perturbed game with independent pri-
vate payoff perturbations in the sense of Harsanyi (1973). They show that only Markovian
equilibria have bounded recall and are purifiable.
We consider a general specification of the multilateral bargaining model and explore
the existence of subgame perfect equilibria under the strong bounded recall restriction that
players’ actions may only be conditional on actions in the previous and the current period.
We make only weak assumptions on the set of feasible payoffs.
Our bargaining protocol is sufficiently general to cover many existing models. Special
cases of our bargaining protocol with alternating or rotating proposers are described in
Rubinstein (1982) and Herrero (1985). We cover protocols with time–invariant recognition
probabilities as studied in Binmore (1987) and Banks and Duggan (2000). Models where
the proposer is selected by means of an underlying Markov process generalize these ap-
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proaches, see Merlo andWilson (1995), Kalandrakis (2006), and Herings and Predtetchinski
(2010), and are also special cases of our bargaining protocol. Part of the literature studies
endogenous bargaining protocols, where a player who rejects becomes the next proposer, a
bargaining protocol introduced in Selten (1981) and also used in Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray,
and Sengupta (1993) in coalitional bargaining theory. Our set–up allows for endogenous
protocols as well, where not only rejections affect the choice of the next proposer, but also
the contents of previous proposals may influence this choice. Our bargaining protocol is
allowed to have infinite recall.
We prove a folk theorem for this general class of multilateral bargaining games. Given
any payoff vector in the set of feasible payoffs, we construct a strategy profile with one–
period recall where the given payoff vector is proposed and accepted in period zero. The
strategy profile is shown to be a subgame perfect equilibrium when all players’ discount
factors are above a particular threshold. The constructed strategy profile is pure and we
do not rely on a public randomization device to establish our main result.
We allow discount factors to be heterogeneous, a case that is hardly studied in the folk
theorem literature. Unlike the classical folk theorem in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986),
Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) find that in two–player repeated games with heterogeneous
discount factors, not all feasible individually rational payoffs can be supported by an equi-
librium, even when both players become very patient. They also point out that it is difficult
to characterize the feasible payoff set in an n–player repeated game. Chen (2008) shows the
possibility of a player obtaining a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff below his effective
minimax value in a three–player repeated game. As our main result demonstrates, no such
difficulties arise for multilateral bargaining games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our class of multi-
lateral bargaining games and we describe how existing models fit into it. In Sections 3 and
4 we analyze the example of Shaked and the results of Herrero (1985). We show that these
results rely on the use of strategies with infinite recall. In Section 5 we present a motivat-
ing example, which illustrates how a payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect
equilibrium in one-period recall strategies. In Section 6 we prove the main result, the folk
theorem for a general class of multilateral bargaining games, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Bargaining games
We consider a dynamic game of perfect information Γ, where a set of N players with
cardinality n ≥ 3 has to agree on the choice of a payoff vector in a set of feasible payoffs
V. We use the notation e0 for the vector (0, . . . , 0), and ei for the i–th unit vector in R
N .
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We make four assumptions on the set of feasible payoffs V :
1. V is a closed subset of RN+ .
2. ∀v ∈ V, ∀i ∈ N, vi ≤ 1.
3. e0 ∈ V, ∀i ∈ N, ei ∈ V.
4. ∀v ∈ V, the set {i ∈ N | vi = 1} contains at most one point.
These four assumptions are satisfied in most applications and are not very restrictive.
Closedness is a standard technical assumption. The second assumption is just a normal-
ization of the set V. Any bounded set of feasible payoffs satisfies this assumption after an
appropriate linear transformation of the payoffs. The first and second assumption together
plus the standard assumption that the bargaining problem is essential implies that we can
assume without loss of generality that for every i ∈ N there is some v ∈ V such that
vi = 1. Together with the standard requirement that V is comprehensive from below, this
would imply the third assumption. The last assumption says that it is not possible for
two players to reach their maximum utility level simultaneously. This assumption would
be satisfied if players can make some transfers to each other. Notice that our assumptions
permit the set V to be non–convex or to consist of a discrete number of points.
In each time period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . nature selects the proposer and the order of respon-
ders by means of a permutation πt : {1, . . . , n} → N . The numbers {1, . . . , n} are the
positions of the players in the bargaining protocol. Player πt(1) makes a proposal xt ∈ V ,
after which Player πt(2) responds to the proposal by accepting or rejecting it. If Player
πt(2) accepts, it is Player πt(3)’s turn to respond to the proposal and so on. If all players
accept the proposal, the game ends and the proposal is implemented. If one of the players
rejects the proposal, the next period begins. In the next time period nature again selects a
permutation, which determines the proposer and the order of the players to respond to the
proposal. The utility of Player i ∈ N who receives outcome xi in period t is δ
t
ixi, where
δi ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor for Player i. The utility of perpetual disagreement is 0 for
all players.
Our bargaining protocol is very general. There are no restrictions on the process by
which the permutation is selected in each round. In particular, in any round the probability
distribution over the set of all permutations might be dependent on the entire history of
play. Special cases of the protocol are described in Selten (1981), Herrero (1985), Binmore
(1987), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Merlo and Wilson (1995), Banks and Duggan (2000),
Kalandrakis (2006), and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010).
In Selten (1981) and Chatterjee et al. (1993) there is an endogenous protocol for the
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players: the player who rejects is the next proposer. In this case the permutation in each
period depends on the history of play in the previous period. Herrero (1985) considers a
model with players that rotate in making offers. In our model, this is achieved by specify-
ing πt(k) = t + k mod n. In Binmore (1987) and Banks and Duggan (2000) the proposer
selection process is modeled by time-invariant recognition probabilities. The probability
that Player i ∈ N is recognized to make a proposal is constant across all periods. In Merlo
and Wilson (1995), Kalandrakis (2006), and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010), the order
in which players act in any period is determined by a Markov process: if the state of the
game is s, then the game moves to state s′ with probability p(s, s′). In other words, the
current state depends on the previous state and actions of the players do not influence the
state, a specification that is allowed for in our model. Our bargaining protocol even allows
for the next proposer to depend on the current proposal, or on proposals made in the past,
something which is not covered in the bargaining literature so far.
A history h is a sequence of actions that have occurred before a particular decision node
in the game. There are three different types of histories. Every period there are histories
ending with a move by nature, there are histories ending with a move by the proposer, and
there are histories ending with a move by a responder. Any non-terminal history is of one
of the following three types:
1. h ∈ H t1 if and only if h = (π
0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt),
2. h ∈ H t2 if and only if h = (π
0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt, xt),
3. h ∈ H t3 if and only if h = (π
0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt, xt, rt),
where πk is a permutation of the set N , xk ∈ V, and rk ∈ N \ {πk(1)} for every k. After a
history h ∈ H t1 the proposer moves, after a history h ∈ H
t
2 a responder moves, and after a
history h ∈ H t3 nature moves. In principle, one has to distinguish between histories after
which the first responder moves, histories after which the second responder moves, and so
on. We shall not make such a distinction; the symbol h ∈ H t2 might denote any of these
histories. When Player πt(j) casts a vote after history h, it is to be understood that the
Players πt(2), . . . , πt(j − 1) have already accepted the proposal. Histories in H t1 are called
proposer histories and those in H t2 responder histories. We denote the union of H
t
1, H
t
2,
and H t3 over t = 0, 1, . . . by H1, H2, and H3, respectively.
A strategy σi of Player i is a function that assigns a point in V to each proposer history
h ∈ H1 ending with a permutation π
t such that πt(1) = i, and an element in {accept, reject}
to each responder history h ∈ H2 with the last permutation π
t being such that πt(1) 6= i.
A strategy profile is denoted by σ = (σi)i∈N . Given a strategy profile σ and a history
h ∈ H t1, we use p
t(h) for the resulting proposal.
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A strategy profile σ is said to have the immediate acceptance property if for every t ≥ 0
and every history h ∈ H t1, the proposal p
t(h) is accepted by all responders. If a strategy
profile σ has the immediate acceptance property, then the first proposal to be made is
accepted, and the game ends in period 0.
A strategy σi has K-recall if it assigns the same action to Player i for all histories of the
same length that coincide in the last K periods. More precisely, a strategy σi has K-recall
if for all histories h and h¯ after which Player i moves, it holds that σi(h) = σi(h¯) whenever
one of the following cases is true for some t = 0, 1, . . .:
1. h, h¯ ∈ H t1, for k = t−K, . . . , t− 1 : π
k = π¯k, xk = x¯k, rk = r¯k, and πt = π¯t;
2. h, h¯ ∈ H t2, for k = t−K, . . . , t− 1 : π
k = π¯k, xk = x¯k, rk = r¯k, and πt = π¯t, xt = x¯t.
A strategy σi has infinite recall if it does not have K-recall for any K.
A strategy profile σ has K-recall if every strategy σi, i ∈ N, has K-recall. A strategy
profile σ has infinite recall if it does not have K-recall for any K.
In this paper we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) as the solution
concept. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium
in every subgame of the original game.
To show that a strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium we show that there
are no profitable one-shot deviations from σ at any history of the game. Consider a non–
terminal history h after which Player i moves. A one–shot deviation by Player i at history
h is a strategy σ′i for Player i that agrees with σi on every non–terminal history except
h. It is said to be profitable if, conditional on the history h being reached, the payoff to
Player i from (σ′i, σ−i) is higher than that from σ.
As our bargaining game is an infinite horizon discounted multi–stage game with ob-
served actions that is continuous at infinity, the following theorem applies.
Theorem 2.1 Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). The strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of Γ if and only if no player has a profitable one–shot deviation from σ at any
history.
The bargaining literature uses either sequential or simultaneous voting. For instance,
Herrero (1985) uses sequential voting, whereas Haller (1986) considers simultaneous voting.
Sequential voting leads to more subgames than simultaneous voting, thereby increasing the
power of subgame perfection. A folk theorem for bargaining games derived under sequential
voting is therefore a stronger result.
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3 Shaked’s example
In this section we revisit an example of a 3–player divide–the–dollar bargaining game from
Binmore, Osborne, and Rubinstein (1992, pp. 191–192), where the example is attributed
to Shaked. It is argued that, for any efficient division of the dollar, there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium such that the given division is proposed and accepted in period 0. We
extend the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies constructed in Binmore, Osborne, and
Rubinstein (1992) to also include inefficient divisions of the dollar and show that they have
infinite recall.
Example 3.1 Consider a game with N = {1, 2, 3} and V = {x ∈ R3+ | x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1}.
The players have a common discount factor δ. The bargaining game proceeds as described
in Section 2, where the bargaining protocol is defined in Table 1.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 ...
πt(1) 1 2 3 1 ...
πt(2) 2 3 1 2 ...
πt(3) 3 1 2 3 ...
Table 1: The bargaining protocol in Example 3.1.
Theorem 3.2 Consider the bargaining game of Example 3.1. If 1/2 < δ < 1, then for
every proposal a ∈ V , there exists an SPE in which at t = 0 the proposal a is made by
Player 1 and accepted by Players 2 and 3.
We now define a strategy profile which satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.2. For
each x ∈ V and each t ≥ 0, we define
it+1(x) = min{k 6= πt(1) | xk ≤ 1/2}.
We inductively define the sequence s0, s1, . . . of functions, where st : V t → V with V t the
t–fold product of V . We define s0 = a and
st+1(x0, . . . , xt) =


st(x0, . . . , xt−1), if xtπt(1) ≤ s
t
πt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1),
eit+1(xt), if x
t
πt(1) > s
t
πt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1).
(3.1)
The function st represents the “state of mind” of the players in period t and corresponds
to the proposal that should be made in period t.
We define the strategy profile σ as follows:
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1. For each t ≥ 0, for each history h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt), Player πt(1)
proposes pt(h) = st(x0, . . . , xt−1).
2. The player who responds first after history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt, xt), i.e. πt(2), accepts
xt if xtπt(2) ≥ δs
t+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt) and rejects otherwise.
3. The player who responds second after history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt, xt), i.e. πt(3), accepts
xt if xtπt(3) ≥ δs
t+1
πt(3)(x
0, . . . , xt) and rejects otherwise.
Claim 3.3 The strategy σ has the immediate acceptance property. In particular, according
to σ, Player 1 proposes a in period 0, which is accepted by both Players 2 and 3.
Proof. Consider a proposer history h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt). We have to
show that the proposal pt(h) is accepted by both responders. Indeed, if Player πt(1) makes
the proposal xt = pt(h) = st(x0, . . . , xt−1), then st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = st(x0, . . . , xt−1) = xt
and so xti ≥ δs
t+1
i (x
0, . . . , xt) for every i. Hence both responders accept xt as desired. The
second part of the claim follows since p0(π0) = a. 
Claim 3.4 If 1/2 < δ < 1, then σ is an SPE.
Proof. We show that at every history none of the players has a profitable one–shot
deviation from σ.
Step 1. Consider a proposer history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt). According to
the strategy σ Player πt(1) makes the proposal st(x0, . . . , xt−1), which is accepted by both
responders according to Claim 3.3. Thus σ results in a payoff of δtstπt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1) to
Player πt(1).
Consider a one–shot deviation by Player πt(1), who proposes a point xt such that
xtπt(1) ≤ s
t
πt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1). It follows that st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = st(x0, . . . , xt−1). Player πt(1)
then receives the payoff δtxtπt(1) ≤ δ
tstπt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1) if xt is accepted by both responders,
and δt+1st+1
πt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt) = δtstπt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1) if xt is rejected. The one–shot deviation
is not profitable.
Consider a one–shot deviation by Player πt(1), who proposes a point xt such that
xtπt(1) > s
t
πt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1). We then have st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = ei, where i = min{k 6= π
t(1) |
xtk ≤ 1/2}. According to the strategy profile σ, x
t would be rejected by Player i, because
Player i is the only player with xti < δs
t+1
i (x
0, . . . , xt). Hence in period t + 1 the proposal
ei will be made and accepted, resulting in payoff 0 for Player π
t(1).
We conclude that there are no profitable one–shot deviations at the proposer history h.
Step 2. Consider a responder history h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt, xt). We check that Player
πt(2) has no profitable one–shot deviation after h.
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Suppose xt is such that xtπt(2) ≥ δs
t+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt), so xt should be accepted according
to σ, leading to a payoff of δtxtπt(2) if Player π
t(3) also accepts xt, or δt+1st+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt) if
Player πt(3) rejects xt. In either case the payoff to Player πt(2) is at least δt+1st+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt).
If Player πt(2) deviates and rejects xt, next period the proposal st+1(x0, . . . , xt) will be made
and accepted. Then Player πt(2) receives payoff δt+1st+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt). We conclude that
rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Suppose xt is such that xtπt(2) < δs
t+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt), so σ prescribes rejection, leading to
a payoff of δt+1st+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt). Suppose Player πt(2) deviates and accepts xt. He then
receives payoff δtxtπt(2) if Player π
t(3) also accepts xt, or δt+1st+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt) if Player πt(3)
rejects xt. In either case acceptance results in a payoff of at most δt+1st+1
πt(2)(x
0, . . . , xt). We
conclude that acceptance is not a profitable deviation. We have checked that there is no
profitable one-shot deviation for Player πt(2).
Step 3. We check that Player πt(3) has no profitable one-shot deviation at the history
h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt, xt).
Suppose xt is such that xtπt(3) ≥ δs
t+1
πt(3)(x
0, . . . , xt), so strategy σ prescribes accep-
tance and leads to payoff δtxtπt(3). If π
t(3) deviates and rejects xt, he only receives
δt+1st+1
πt(3)(x
0, . . . , xt). We conclude that rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Suppose xt is such that xtπt(3) < δs
t+1
πt(3)(x
0, . . . , xt). The strategy σ prescribes rejection
and leads to payoff δt+1st+1
πt(3)(x
0, . . . , xt). If πt(3) accepts xt, he only receives δtxtπt(3). We
conclude that acceptance is not a profitable deviation. 
We conclude our discussion of Shaked’s construction by showing that the strategy profile
σ has infinite recall. Notice that the functions st defining the state of mind of the players
are being determined recursively, that is the new state of mind st+1 is computed as a
function of the current state st and the current proposal xt. We will now provide sufficient
conditions for recursively defined functions to have infinite recall.
Let X and Y be sets with Y ⊂ X . For each t ≥ 1, let st : X t → Y be a function, where
X t is the t–fold product of the set X . We write s = (s0, s1, . . . ). The sequence s is said
to have 0–recall if each st is a constant function. It is said to have k–recall for k ≥ 1 if
st(x0, . . . , xt−1) = st(x¯0, . . . , x¯t−1) whenever t ≥ k and xℓ = x¯ℓ for each ℓ ∈ {t−k, . . . , t−1}.
The sequence is said to have infinite recall if it does not have k–recall for any k ≥ 0.
Let a be a point of Y , and for each t ≥ 1 let f t : X × Y → Y . We define the sequence
s = (s0, s1, . . . ) of functions st : X t → Y by induction on t as follows:
s0 = a, (3.2)
st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = f t+1(xt, st(x0, . . . , xt−1)), t ≥ 0. (3.3)
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Claim 3.5 Let f = (f 1, f 2, . . .) and a ∈ Y be such that [1] f t(a, a) = a for each t ≥ 1,
[2] there is a t ≥ 1 and an x ∈ X such that f t(x, a) 6= a, and [3] for each t ≥ 1, for every
y, y′ ∈ Y such that y 6= y′, there is x ∈ X such that f t(x, y) 6= f t(x, y′). Then s as defined
by (3.2)–(3.3) has infinite recall.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. We show that s does not have 0–recall. Suppose
on the contrary that st is a constant for each t. Then by [1] each st is identically equal to
a on X t. But for t and x as in Condition [2] we have that
st(a, . . . , a, x) = f t(x, st−1(a, . . . , a)) = f t(x, a) 6= a,
leading to a contradiction.
Assume s does not have k–recall for some k ≥ 0. Then there is t ≥ k and there are
points (x0, . . . , xt−1), (x¯0, . . . , x¯t−1) ∈ X t such that xℓ = x¯ℓ for each ℓ ∈ {t− k, . . . , t− 1},
and
st(x0, . . . , xt−1) 6= st(x¯0, . . . , x¯t−1).
It then follows by [3] that there is an xt ∈ X such that f t+1(xt, st(x0, . . . , xt−1)) 6=
f t+1(xt, st(x¯0, . . . , x¯t−1)), so
st+1(x0, . . . , xt−1, xt) 6= st+1(x¯0, . . . , x¯t−1, xt),
proving that s does not have k + 1–recall. 
Claim 3.6 The strategy profile σ has infinite recall.
Proof. We prove the claim by showing that the sequence s = (s0, s1, . . . ) of states of mind
as defined by Equation (3.1) has infinite recall. We take X = V and Y = {e1, e2, e3, a}
and, for t = 1, 2, 3, we define the function f t : X × Y → Y by
f t(x, y) =


y, if xt ≤ yt,
eit(x), if xt > yt,
where it(x) = min{k 6= t | xk ≤ 1/2}. For k ∈ N and t = 1, 2, 3, we define f
t+3k = f t. The
sequence s as defined in Equation (3.3) is identical to the one defined in (3.1). Table 2)
displays some of the values of it and f t.
We verify that f = (f 1, f 2, . . .) meets the conditions of Claim 3.5. By definition of f t
we have that f t(a, a) = a, so Condition [1] holds.
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x i1(x) i2(x) i3(x)
e1 2 3 2
e2 3 1 1
e3 2 1 1
x y f 1(x, y) f 2(x, y) f 3(x, y)
e1 e1 e1 e1 e1
e2 e1 e1 e1 e1
e3 e1 e1 e1 e1
e1 e2 e2 e2 e2
e2 e2 e2 e2 e2
e3 e2 e2 e2 e1
e1 e3 e2 e3 e3
e2 e3 e3 e1 e3
e3 e3 e3 e3 e3
Table 2: Some of the values of it and f t.
We now verify that Condition [2] holds. If a is not an element of {e1, e2, e3}, then we
have f 1(e1, a) = e2 6= a. If a = e1, we take x = (2/3, 1/3, 0), and find that f
2(x, e1) = e3 6=
a. If a = e2, we have f
3(e3, e2) = e1 6= a. If a = e3, we have f
1(e1, e3) = e2 6= a.
To verify [3], let y and y′ be two distinct points of Y . If y is an element of {e1, e2, e3}
while y′ = a is not, then f t(a, a) = a 6= f t(et, a) since f
t(et, a) is an element {e1, e2, e3}. If
both y and y′ are members of {e1, e2, e3}, then the condition follows from Table 2. This
completes the proof. 
4 Herrero–Haller’s example
In this section we re–examine the example of an n–player divide-the–dollar game as studied
in Herrero (1985). Herrero claims that given any division of the dollar, there is a subgame
perfect perfect equilibrium such that the given division is proposed and unanimously ac-
cepted in period zero. We quote Herrero’s definition of the strategy profile and argue that
it is incomplete. We next reproduce the proof of the claim given by Hans Haller (private
communication). We show that the strategies used in Haller’s proof have infinite recall.
Example 4.1 Consider a game with N = {1, . . . , n} and V = {x ∈ Rn+ | x1+· · ·+xn ≤ 1}.
The players have a common discount factor δ. The game proceeds as in Section 2, with
the sequence of moves given by the following rule:
For the case n = 3, the game coincides with the one in the preceding section.
Theorem 4.2 Consider the bargaining game of Example 4.1. If 1/(n− 1) < δ < 1, then
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t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 . . . t = n− 1 t = n . . .
πt(1) 1 2 3 . . . n 1 . . .
πt(2) 2 3 4 . . . 1 2 . . .
πt(3) 3 4 5 . . . 2 3 . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
πt(n− 1) n− 1 n 1 . . . n− 2 n− 1 . . .
πt(n) n 1 2 . . . n− 1 n . . .
Table 3: The bargaining protocol in Example 4.1.
for every proposal a ∈ V, there exists an SPE in which at t = 0 the proposal a is made by
Player 1 and accepted by Players 2 and 3.
Herrero (1985) defines the following strategy profile in an attempt to prove Theorem 4.2.
1. Player 1 proposes a, which is unanimously accepted at time 0.
2. a is proposed and accepted at time t, provided a was proposed at time t − 1 (all
t > 0).
3. If Player j deviates from (1) or (2) and proposes y such that yk < δ for some k 6= j
at time τ , then
(a) Player k rejects y
(b) ek is proposed and accepted at time τ + 1
(c) ek is proposed and accepted at time t, provided ek was proposed at time t − 1
(all t > τ + 1)
(d) and, if Player l deviates from (b) or (c) to propose z with zh < δ for some h 6= l
at time T , then begin (a) again with j = l and k = h.
Unfortunately, the above definition appears to be incomplete: if under item 3 there
is more than one Player k 6= j with yk < δ it is not clear which one should be chosen.
To illustrate this difficulty, consider a history where in period 0 Player 1 proposes y =
(δ, (1 − δ)/2, (1− δ)/2) 6= a and Player 2 accepts. It is now Player 3’s turn to respond to
the proposal. Notice that y2 < δ and y3 < δ. Should Player 3 accept or reject the proposal
y? This question cannot be answered unless it is decided whether the next proposal is
going to be e2 or e3 if Player 3 rejects y.
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It is clear that one can interpret Conditions 1–3 in a number of ways. One such
interpretation is due to Haller (private communication) and is reproduced below. For each
t ≥ 0, for each x ∈ V, we define
it+1(x) = min{k 6= πt(1) | xk ≤ δ}.
This expression is well–defined since we assume that δ > 1/(n− 1). We inductively define
the functions st : V t → V. We define s0 = a and
st+1(x0, . . . , xt) =


st(x0, . . . , xt−1), if xt = st(x0, . . . , xt−1),
eit+1(xt), if x
t 6= st(x0, . . . , xt−1).
We define the strategy profile σ as follows:
1. For each t ≥ 0, for each history h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt), Player πt(1)
proposes pt(h) = st(x0, . . . , xt−1).
2. After history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt, xt), Player πt(k), where k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, accepts xt if
[xt = st(x0, . . . , xt−1)] or [it+1(xt) = πt(ℓ) and k > ℓ] and rejects otherwise.
The strategy profile in Theorem 4.2 is similar to the one in Theorem 3.2. The differences
are in the calculation of the state of mind and in the acceptance criteria for the players
who respond. The state of mind in Theorem 3.2 changes if the proposer demands a payoff
greater than the corresponding coordinate of the current state of mind. The state of mind
in Theorem 4.2 changes if the proposal is not equal to the current state of mind. In a
sense, the state of mind in Theorem 4.2 changes more frequently. In both cases, the state
of mind becomes a unit vector after a change. In Theorem 3.2 the state of mind becomes a
unit vector that gives one to the responding player with the lowest index for whom a share
less than or equal to 1/2 was proposed. In Theorem 4.2 the state of mind becomes a unit
vector that gives one to the responding player with the lowest index for whom a share less
than δ was proposed. In Theorem 3.2, the responding players compare a proposal to the
state of mind st+1(x0, . . . , xt), which will be proposed next period according to the strategy
profile. In Theorem 4.2, the responding players compare a proposal to the state of mind
st(x0, . . . , xt−1), which should have been proposed in this period, and also take the order
of the responders into account.
The following result is immediate from the definition above.
Claim 4.3 The strategy σ has the immediate acceptance property. In particular, according
to σ, Player 1 proposes a in period 0, which is accepted by Players 2, . . . , n.
Claim 4.4 If 1/(n− 1) < δ < 1, then σ is an SPE.
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Proof. We show that at every history none of the players has a profitable one–shot
deviation from σ.
Step 1. Consider a proposer history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt). The strategy
σ leads to a payoff of δtstπt(1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1) for Player πt(1). Suppose Player πt(1) deviates
from σ and proposes xt 6= st(x0, . . . , xt−1). Since it+1(xt) 6= it(1), the proposal xt is rejected
by Player πt(2) and next period the proposal st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = eit+1(xt) will be made and
accepted. This leaves Player πt(1) with a payoff of 0.
Step 2. Consider a responder history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt, xt) and a player j = πt(k),
where k ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Consider first the case where xt = st(x0, . . . , xt−1). Strategy σ prescribes accep-
tance and leads to a payoff of δtxtj for Player j. If j rejects x
t, next period the proposal
st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = st(x0, . . . , xt−1) = xt will be made and accepted, resulting in a payoff of
δt+1xtj to Player j. Hence rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Consider next the case where xt 6= st(x0, . . . , xt−1). It follows that st+1(x0, . . . , xt) =
eit+1(xt). Let ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n} be such that π
t(ℓ) = it+1(xt).We consider three cases depending
on whether k < ℓ, k > ℓ, or k = ℓ.
Case 1: k < ℓ. According to σ, Player j should reject, which leads to a payoff of 0 to
Player j since the rejection of xt is followed by the proposal eit+1(xt), which is accepted.
Suppose Player j accepts xt. Since k + 1 ≤ ℓ, Player πt(k + 1) will reject xt according to
σ, so also in this case the proposal eit+1(xt) is made and accepted in the next period. We
conclude that acceptance is not a profitable deviation.
Case 2: k > ℓ. According to σ, Player j accepts, which leads to payoff δtxtj , because
the players following j in the response order all accept xt according to σ. If j rejects xt,
next period the proposal eit+1(xt) will be made and accepted, leaving Player j with payoff
0. We conclude that rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Case 3: k = ℓ. In this case it+1(xt) = j and the strategy σ prescribes rejection. It leads
to a payoff of δt+1 to Player j since following the rejection of xt the proposal eit+1(xt) will
be made and accepted next period. Suppose on the other hand that Player j accepts xt.
Since the players following j in the response order all accept xt, this leads to a payoff of
δtxtj . It follows by definition of i
t+1(xt) that xtj ≤ δ. We conclude that acceptance is not a
profitable deviation.
We have checked that no player has a profitable one–shot deviation from σ. 
Claim 4.5 The strategy profile σ has infinite recall.
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Proof. We take Y = {e1, . . . , en, a} and, for t = 1, . . . , n, we define the function f
t :
V × Y → Y by
f t(x, y) =


y, if x = y,
eit(x), otherwise,
where it(x) = min{k 6= t | xk ≤ δ}. For k ∈ N and t = 1, . . . , n, we define f
t+nk = f t. We
verify next that the functions f t thus defined satisfy the conditions of Claim 3.5.
Condition [1] is immediate. To verify Condition [2], we argue as follows. If a is not a
member of {e1, . . . , en}, then f
1(e1, a) = e2 6= a. If a = et for some t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, take
any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {t} and notice that f t(ei, et) = eit(ei) 6= et because i
t(ei) 6= t.
To verify condition [3], consider t ≥ 1 and y, y′ ∈ Y with y 6= y′. We have f t(y, y) = y
and f t(y, y′) = eit(y). Suppose y = eit(y) and define j = i
t(y). Since it(ej) 6= j, we have that
ej = y = eit(ej) 6= ej ,
a contradiction. 
5 Illustration of the main result
Consider a three–player bargaining game where only Player 1 can make proposals. Intuition
tells us that such a game is hardly of any interest: since Player 1 has all the bargaining
power, surely the only outcome that can arise in this game is the one where Player 1 gets
the entire surplus? We show this intuition to be wrong. In fact, there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium where Player 2 gets the entire surplus and one where Player 3 does.
Furthermore, there is even a subgame perfect equilibrium where the zero vector (0, 0, 0) is
proposed and accepted. Unlike the examples of the preceding sections, the subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies constructed below have one–period recall. To compute his proposal
in a given period, Player 1 only has to remember his previous proposal and whether it was
Player 2 or 3 who rejected it. The responses of Players 2 and 3 only depend on the current
proposal.
While these claims are subsumed by our main theorem in the next section, we offer an
explicit proof. We do so to illustrate the construction in the next section.
Example 5.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and V = {x ∈ R3+ | x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1}. The bargaining
game proceeds as described in Section 2, where the period t permutation πt is given by
πt(i) = i for every t. So every period Player 1 makes the proposal, after which Player 2
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responds. If Player 2 accepts, it is Player 3’s turn to respond to the proposal. The players
have a common discount factor δ. We define U = {e0, e2, e3}.
Theorem 5.2 Consider the bargaining game of Example 5.1. If 1/2 < δ < 1, then for
every a ∈ U there exists a one–period recall SPE such that in period 0 a is proposed by
Player 1 and accepted by Players 2 and 3.
Since the permutation πt is fixed throughout the game, we omit it from the notation for
histories. The strategy profile σ is defined as follows.
1. At t = 0, Player 1 proposes a. For each t ≥ 1, after history h = (x0, r0, . . . , xt−1, rt−1),
Player 1 proposes
pt(h) =


e0, if [x
t−1 ∈ U ],
e2, if [x
t−1 6∈ U and rt−1 = 2],
e3, if [x
t−1 6∈ U and rt−1 = 3].
2. For t ≥ 0, after history (x0, r0, . . . , xt−1, rt−1, xt), Player 2 accepts xt if xt ∈ U , and
rejects otherwise.
3. For t ≥ 0, after history (x0, r0, . . . , xt−1, rt−1, xt), Player 3 accepts xt if xt ∈ U or
xt3 ≥ δ, and rejects otherwise.
According to the strategy profile, the proposal a ∈ U is made and accepted in period
0. Any proposal outside U is rejected by Player 2, after which proposal e2 is made and
accepted in the next period.
The intuition behind the strategies is the following. Player 1 is indifferent between any
of his actions, because any proposal that Player 2 accepts gives him payoff 0. Player 2 is
encouraged to accept proposals from U and to reject other proposals: after rejection of a
proposal that is not from U , e2 will be proposed and accepted. The same logic works for
Player 3 except that he also accepts proposals that give him payoff higher than or equal
to δ.
Rubinstein (1982) has shown that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for
the two–player case. Our approach indeed breaks down for the case with two players.
Subgame perfection requires the last player who responds to a proposal offering a payoff
of at least δ to accept. In the two–player case, this enables the proposer to obtain at least
a payoff of 1− δ, and a contraction argument can be used to pin down equilibrium payoffs
to a unique value. In cases with three or more players, a proposer cannot make a proposal
that guarantees him a strictly positive payoff, as the proposer cannot offer more than δ to
all the responders if δ is sufficiently high.
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Claim 5.3 The strategy profile σ has the immediate acceptance property. If 1/2 < δ < 1,
the strategy profile σ is an SPE.
Proof. The profile σ has the immediate acceptance property because Player 1 only makes
proposals that belong to U and all members of U are accepted by Players 2 and 3. We
verify that the one-shot deviation principle is satisfied.
Step 1. We show that Player 1 has no profitable one–shot deviations. At each history
h ∈ H t1 any of Player 1’s actions yields Player 1 a payoff of zero. This follows because the
only proposals accepted by Player 2 are e0, e2, and e3, and each of these proposals gives
payoff 0 to Player 1. Hence Player 1 is indifferent between any of his actions. In particular,
Player 1 has no profitable deviations from σ.
Step 2. We show that Players 2 and 3 have no profitable one–shot deviations. Take a
history h ∈ H t2 ending with the proposal x
t. We consider three cases:
1. xt ∈ U ,
2. xt 6∈ U and xt3 < δ,
3. xt 6∈ U and xt3 ≥ δ.
Case 1: xt ∈ U .
The strategy σ calls for the acceptance of xt. If Player 2 or Player 3 deviates and
rejects, the proposal e0 is made and accepted next period. Clearly rejection is not a
profitable deviation for the responding players.
Case 2: xt 6∈ U and xt3 < δ.
Consider Player 3. The strategy σ recommends that Player 3 rejects. Rejection gives
Player 3 a payoff of δt+1, because the proposal e3 is made and accepted in period t+ 1. If
Player 3 deviates and accepts the proposal, he obtains payoff δtxt3 < δ
t+1. So acceptance
is not a profitable deviation.
Consider Player 2. The strategy σ calls for Player 2 to reject. Rejection gives Player
2 a payoff of δt+1, because the proposal e2 is made and accepted next period. Suppose
now Player 2 deviates and accepts xt. Then Player 3 rejects xt and in period t + 1 the
proposal e3 is made and accepted, leaving Player 2 with payoff zero. So acceptance is not
a profitable deviation.
Case 3: xt 6∈ U and xt3 ≥ δ.
Consider Player 3. According to σ Player 3 should accept. Acceptance gives Player 3
the payoff δtxt3 ≥ δ
t+1. If Player 3 deviates and rejects the proposal, the proposal e3 is
made and accepted in period t + 1, yielding Player 3 the payoff δt+1. So rejection is not a
profitable deviation.
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Consider Player 2. According to the strategy σ Player 2 must reject. Rejection gives
Player 2 a payoff of δt+1, because the proposal e2 is made and accepted in period t + 1.
Suppose now Player 2 deviates and accepts. Since Player 3 accepts xt, Player 2 then re-
ceives a payoff of δtxt2. Now x
t
2 ≤ 1− x
t
3 ≤ 1− δ ≤ δ, so δ
txt2 ≤ δ
t+1. So acceptance is not
a profitable deviation. 
Our main result generalizes the example above in a number of ways. As has been
discussed in Section 2, we allow nature’s choice of the permutations to be probabilistic and
history dependent, where the choice of nature may even depend on aspects of the history
of more than one period ago. Secondly, we only impose rather minimal assumptions on
the set V of feasible payoffs. And finally, we show that any vector in the set V , not just
the unit vectors, can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
6 The folk theorem for bargaining games
In this section we prove our main result: if the players are sufficiently patient, given any
point a of the set V one can find a subgame perfect equilibrium having one–period recall
such that on the equilibrium path of play the point a is proposed and accepted in period
zero. As a first step we identify the level of patience needed for the result to hold.
Lemma 6.1 There exists δ¯ < 1 such that for every v ∈ V the set {i ∈ N : vi ≥ δ¯} contains
at most one point.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists i, j ∈ N with i 6= j and a sequence (vm)m∈N of
points in V such that vmi ≥ 1 − 1/m and v
m
j ≥ 1 − 1/m. Since the set V is compact, we
can assume without loss of generality that vm converges to v¯ ∈ V. But then v¯i ≥ 1 and
v¯j ≥ 1, contradicting Assumption 4. 
For the rest of this section we fix some δ¯ < 1 such that Lemma 6.1 is satisfied. We are
now in a position to state our main result.
Theorem 6.2 Given any point a ∈ V there exists a strategy profile σ such that:
[1] The proposal a is made in period 0 and is unanimously accepted. Furthermore, the
strategy σ has the immediate acceptance property.
[2] The strategy σ has 1–period recall.
[3] If for every i ∈ N it holds that δi ≥ δ¯, then σ is an SPE.
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We define our strategy profile by specifying actions for a player who is in a particular
position in the game. These actions do not depend on the identity of the player. There
are n positions in the game: the proposer, the player who responds first, the player who
responds second, and so on. The strategy for the proposer, πt(1), specifies the proposal
at each period t, as a function pt(h) of the history of play up to t. The strategies for
“the player who responds first”, Player πt(2), “the player who responds second”, Player
πt(3), . . ., and “the player who responds last”, Player πt(n), specifies their reaction to the
proposal contingent on the history of play up to t.
We define E = {e0} ∪ {ei | i ∈ N}. We define the strategy σ as follows:
1. In period t = 0, Player π0(1) proposes p0 = a. At t = 1, after history h =
(π0, x0, r0, π1), Player π1(1) proposes
p1(h) =


e0, if x
0 = a,
er0 , if x
0 6= a.
For each t ≥ 2, after history h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt), Player πt(1)
proposes
pt(h) =


e0, if x
t−1 ∈ E,
ert−1 , if x
t−1 6∈ E.
2. After history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt, xt), Player πt(j), j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1},
accepts xt if
• [xt = pt(π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt)] or
• [t ≥ 1 and xt ∈ E and xt 6= eπt(1)],
and rejects otherwise.
3. After history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt−1, xt−1, rt−1, πt, xt), Player πt(n) accepts xt if
• [xt = pt(π0, x0, r0, . . . , πt)] or
• [t ≥ 1 and xt ∈ E and xt 6= eπt(1)] or
• [xtπt(n) ≥ δπt(n)],
and rejects otherwise.
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Part [1] of Theorem 6.2 is immediate from the definition above: indeed, for every h ∈ H t1
the proposal pt(h) is accepted by all the responders. In particular, the period 0 proposal
p0 = a is unanimously accepted.
Part [2] is equally straightforward: Notice that every proposer history in period t ≥ 1
is of the form (h, xt−1, rt−1, πt) where h ∈ H t−11 is some proposer history in period t − 1,
while a responder history at t can be written as (h, xt−1, rt−1, πt, xt) where h ∈ H t−11 . It is
clear from the definition above that the proposal pt(h, xt−1, rt−1, πt) at the proposal history
(h, xt−1, rt−1, πt) does not depend on h. And hence also the response σi(h, x
t−1, rt−1, πt, xt)
of Player i 6= πt(1) at the responder history (h, xt−1, rt−1, πt, xt) does not depend on h. It
follows that the strategy profile σ has one–period recall.
We proceed to prove part [3] of the theorem. The intuition behind our construction
could be summarized as follows. According to σ the responders only accept a proposal
pt(h) as prescribed by the strategy σ, along with those unit vectors which give 0 to the
proposer. This implies that any deviation by a proposer can only result in a payoff of
zero, the essence of Claim 6.3 below. Rejections of proposals in the set E are penalized by
having the next proposer offer the zero vector e0. Rejections of proposals outside the set
E are rewarded by having the next proposer offer the maximum payoff of 1 to the rejector.
The proof of part [3] of Theorem 6.2 is divided into three steps. Claim 6.3 shows that
for each proposer history h ∈ H t1 any proposal other than p
t(h) yields the proposer a payoff
of zero. This implies in particular that no proposer has a profitable one–shot deviation
from σ. Claim 6.4 shows that there are no profitable one–shot deviations from σ at the
responder histories in period 0, and Claim 6.5 that there are no such deviations at period
t ≥ 1. In Claims 6.4 and 6.5 we assume that for every i ∈ N, δi ≥ δ¯.
Claim 6.3 Consider a proposer history h ∈ H t1. If a proposal x
t 6= pt(h) is made after
history h, it leads to a payoff of 0 for the proposer. In particular, there are no profitable
one–shot deviations from σ at h.
Proof. Suppose the history h ends with the permutation πt. Take any xt 6= pt(h). We
consider two cases depending on whether t = 0 or t ≥ 1.
• Case t = 0. We have p0 = a. If a proposal x0 6= a is made, it is rejected by Player
π0(2), and in period 1 the proposal eπ0(2) will be made and accepted, see part [1] of
Theorem 6.2. This leads to payoff 0 for Player π0(1).
• Case t ≥ 1. We consider three subcases:
1. Case xt = eπt(1). Since x
t 6= pt(h), the proposal xt is rejected by Player πt(2).
Since the period t+1 proposal e0 is accepted by part [1] of Theorem 6.2, Player
πt(1) receives 0.
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2. Case xt ∈ E \ {eπt(1)}. In this case the proposal x
t is unanimously accepted.
Player πt(1) receives payoff 0.
3. Case xt 6∈ E. In this case the proposal xt is rejected by Player πt(2). The next
proposal is eπt(2), which is accepted. This leads to payoff 0 for Player π
t(1).
In each case Player πt(1) receives a payoff of zero. 
Claim 6.4 Consider a responder history h ∈ H02 . If, for every i ∈ N, δi ≥ δ¯, then there
are no profitable one–shot deviations from σ at h.
Proof. Let h = (π0, x0). We consider the following three cases:
1. x0 = a,
2. x0 6= a and x0
π0(n) ≥ δπ0(n),
3. x0 6= a and x0
π0(n) < δπ0(n).
Case 1: x0 = a. Consider Player π0(j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Strategy σ prescribes
that the proposal x0 be accepted. Suppose Player π0(j) rejects x0 instead. Then in period
1 the proposal e0 will be made and accepted. Since 0 is the lowest payoff in the game,
rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Case 2: x0 6= a and x0
π0(n) ≥ δπ0(n).
Consider Player π0(n). According to σ Player π0(n) accepts x0 and receives a payoff
of x0
π0(n) ≥ δπ0(n). If Player π
0(n) deviates and rejects, in period 1 the proposal eπ0(n) is
made and accepted. It leads to a payoff of δπ0(n) for Player π
0(n), so the deviation is not
profitable.
Consider Player π0(n − 1). According to σ Player π0(n − 1) rejects x0, the proposal
eπ0(n−1) is made and accepted next period, and Player π
0(n − 1) receives payoff δπ0(n−1).
Suppose now Player π0(n− 1) deviates and accepts x0. Since according to σ Player π0(n)
accepts x0, Player π0(n − 1) receives the payoff x0
π0(n−1). Now since x
0 belongs to V and
x0
π0(n) ≥ δπ0(n) ≥ δ¯, we have x
0
π0(n−1) < δ¯ ≤ δπ0(n−1) by the choice of δ¯. So the deviation is
not profitable.
Consider Player π0(j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 2}. According to the strategy profile σ
Player π0(j) rejects, and the proposal eπ0(j) is made and accepted next period. This leads
to a payoff of δπ0(j). Suppose now Player π
0(j) deviates and accepts x0. Then x0 will be
rejected by Player π0(j + 1), and the next proposal eπ0(j+1) will be made and accepted.
This leads to a payoff of zero to Player π0(j). So the deviation is not profitable.
Case 3: x0 6= a and x0
π0(n) < δπ0(n).
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Consider Player π0(n). According to σ Player π0(n) rejects, and the proposal eπ0(n) is
made and accepted in period 1, leading to a payoff of δπ0(n) to Player π
0(n). If Player π0(n)
deviates and accepts, he receives only x0π0(n) < δπ0(n), so the deviation is not profitable.
Consider Player π0(j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. According to σ Player π0(j) rejects,
and the proposal eπ0(j) is made and accepted in period 1, leading to a payoff of δπ0(j) for
Player π0(j). Suppose Player π0(j) deviates and accepts. Then x0 will be rejected by
Player π0(j + 1) and next period the proposal eπ0(j+1) will be made and accepted, thus
leaving Player π0(j) with zero payoff. Thus the deviation is not profitable. 
Claim 6.5 Consider a responder history h ∈ H t2 where t ≥ 1. If, for every i ∈ N, δi ≥ δ¯,
then there are no profitable one–shot deviations from σ at h.
Proof. The history h is of the form h = (h′, πt, xt) where h′ ∈ H t−13 , π
t is the permutation
chosen by nature at h′, and xt is the proposal chosen by the Player πt(1) at (h′, πt). We
consider the following cases:
1. xt ∈ E \ {eπt(1)},
2. xt = eπt(1),
3. xt 6∈ E and xtπt(n) ≥ δπt(n),
4. xt 6∈ E and xtπt(n) < δπt(n).
Case 1: xt ∈ E \ {eπt(1)}.
According to the strategy σ all the responders πt(j) for j ∈ {2, . . . n} accept xt. In
case of a rejection, next period the proposal e0 is made and accepted. Since 0 is the lowest
possible payoff in the game, a deviation is not profitable.
Case 2: xt = eπt(1).
Either action of Player πt(j) for j ∈ {2, . . . , n} results in a payoff of zero. Indeed, if
the proposal xt is accepted, Player πt(j) receives xtπt(j) = 0. And if x
t is rejected, the next
proposal will be e0, which is accepted. In either case Player π
t(j) receives payoff 0. It
follows that there are no profitable one–shot deviations from σ at h.
Case 3: xt 6∈ E and xtπt(n) ≥ δπt(n).
Notice that xt 6= pt(h′, πt) because for t ≥ 1 the proposal pt(h′, πt) belongs to E.
Consider Player πt(n). According to σ Player πt(n) accepts xt and receives a payoff of
δtπt(n)x
t
πt(n) ≥ δ
t+1
πt(n). If Player π
t(n) deviates and rejects, in period t+ 1 the proposal eπt(n)
is made and accepted. This leads to a payoff of δt+1
πt(n) for Player π
t(n), so the deviation is
not profitable.
23
Consider Player πt(n − 1). According to σ Player πt(n − 1) rejects xt, the proposal
eπt(n−1) is made and accepted next period, and Player π
t(n − 1) receives payoff δt+1
πt(n−1).
Suppose now Player πt(n− 1) deviates and accepts xt. Since according to σ Player πt(n)
accepts xt, Player πt(n−1) then receives the payoff δtπt(n−1)x
t
πt(n−1). Now since x
t is a point
of V and xtπt(n) ≥ δπt(n) ≥ δ¯, we have x
t
πt(n−1) < δ¯ ≤ δπt(n−1), by the choice of δ¯. Hence
δtπt(n−1)x
t
πt(n−1) < δ
t+1
πt(n−1) and the deviation is not profitable.
Consider Player πt(j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 2}. According to the strategy profile σ
Player πt(j) rejects, and the proposal eπt(j) is made and accepted next period. This leads
to a payoff of δt+1
πt(j). Suppose now Player π
t(j) deviates and accepts xt. Then xt will
be rejected by Player πt(j + 1), and the next period proposal eπt(j+1) will be made and
accepted. This leads to a payoff of zero to Player πt(j). So the deviation is not profitable.
Case 4: xt 6∈ E and xtπt(n) < δπt(n).
Notice that xt is not equal to pt(h′, πt) since for t ≥ 1 the latter is an element of E.
Consider Player πt(n). According to σ Player πt(n) rejects, and the proposal eπt(n) is
made and accepted in period t + 1, leading to a payoff of δt+1
πt(n) to Player π
t(n). If Player
πt(n) deviates and accepts, he receives only a payoff of δtπt(n)x
t
πt(n) < δ
t+1
πt(n), so the deviation
is not profitable.
Consider Player πt(j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. According to σ Player πt(j) rejects,
and the proposal eπt(j) is made and accepted in period t + 1, leading to a payoff of δ
t+1
πt(j)
for Player πt(j). Suppose Player πt(j) deviates and accepts. Then xt will be rejected by
Player πt(j + 1) and the proposal eπt(j+1) will be made and accepted in period t + 1, thus
leaving Player πt(j) with zero payoff. Thus the deviation is not profitable. 
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have proved a folk theorem for a general class of bargaining games with
three or more players. We show that for any vector of feasible payoffs there is a subgame
perfect equilibrium such that the vector of feasible payoffs is proposed and accepted in
period 0. The subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are pure and have one–period recall.
The existing literature has shown such a result only for specific examples of bargaining
games and relied on strategies having infinite recall.
Our bargaining protocol is sufficiently general to cover many bargaining protocols stud-
ied in the literature as special cases. Moreover, it covers cases that have not been studied in
the literature so far, where for instance the protocol depends on proposals that have been
made in previous rounds. Although our equilibrium strategies have one–period recall, the
protocol itself is allowed to depend on aspects of the history that are related to arbitrarily
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many periods before. Several authors have found that the assumption of bounded recall
may severely limit the set of outcomes that can occur in an equilibrium. On the other
hand, Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2009) and Mailath and Olszewski (2011) provide folk theo-
rems for repeated games where strategies have bounded recall. Our results show that not
even one–period recall is sufficient to limit the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs
in multilateral bargaining games.
8 References
Aumann, R.J. (1981), “Survey of Repeated Games,” in V. Bo¨hm and H.H. Nachtkamp
(eds.), Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar
Morgenstern, Bibliografisches Institut Mannheim, pp. 11–42.
Banks, J., and J. Duggan (2000), “A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice,” Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 94, 73–88.
Bhaskar, V., G.J. Mailath, and S. Morris (2009), “A Foundation for Markov Equi-
libria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games,” PIER Working Paper, 09–029,
1–21.
Binmore, K. (1987), “Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models,” in K. Binmore and P.
Dasgupta (eds.), The Economics of Bargaining, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, pp.
77–105.
Binmore, K., M.J. Osborne, and A. Rubinstein (1992), “Non–Cooperative Mod-
els of Bargaining,” in R.J. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory,
Volume 1, pp. 179–225.
Chatterjee, K., B. Dutta, D. Ray, and K. Sengupta (1993), “A Noncooperative
Theory of Coalitional Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies, 60, 463–477.
Chen, B. (2008), “On Effective Minimax Payoffs and Unequal Discounting,” Economics
Letters, 100, 105–107.
Cole, H.L., and N. Kocherlakota (2005), “Finite Memory and Imperfect Monitor-
ing,” Games and Economic Behavior, 53, 59–72.
Dutta, P.K. (1995), “A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 66, 1–32.
25
Friedman, J. (1971), “A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 38, 1–12.
Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin (1986), “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with
Discounting or with Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, 54, 533–554.
Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts.
Fudenberg, D., and Y. Yamamoto (2011), “The Folk Theorem For Irreducible
Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,” Journal of Economic Theory
146, 1664-1683.
Haller, H. (1986), “Non-cooperative Bargaining ofN ≥ 3 Players,” Economics Letters,
22, 11–13.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1973), “Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale
for Mixed-strategy Equilibrium Points,” International Journal of Game Theory, 2,
1–23.
Herings, P.J.J., and A. Predtetchinski (2010), “One-dimensional Bargaining with
Markov Recognition Probabilities,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 189–215.
Herrero, M.J. (1985), A Strategic Bargaining Approach to Market Institutions, PhD
Thesis, London School of Economics, 1–111.
Ho¨rner, J., and W. Olszewski (2009), “How Robust Is the Folk Theorem,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 124, 1773–1814.
Kalandrakis, T. (2006), “Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class
of Bargaining Games,” Economic Theory, 28, 309–329.
Lehrer, E., and A. Pauzner (1999), “Repeated Games with Differential Time Pref-
erences,” Econometrica, 67, 393–412.
Mailath, G.J., and Olszewski (2011), “Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under
(Almost) Perfect Monitoring,” Games and Economic Behavior, 71, 174–192.
Merlo, A., and C. Wilson (1995), “A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with
Complete Information,” Econometrica, 63, 371–399.
Rubinstein, A., (1979) “Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 1–9.
26
Rubinstein, A. (1982), “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica,
50, 97–109.
Sabourian, H. (1998), “Repeated Games withM-Period Bounded Memory (Pure Strate-
gies),” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 30, 1–35.
Selten, R. (1981), “A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining,”
in V. Bo¨hm and H.H. Nachtkamp (eds.), Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical
Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Bibliografisches Institut Mannheim, pp.
131–151.
27
